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ata, it has been suggested, is the oil of the new 
economy.1 In spite of the way the internet has changed 
people’s lives, surprisingly little work has been done to 
link some of the normative issues explored in fields of 
inquiry such as “computer ethics”2 or “information ethics”3 with 
debates in a certain stream of political philosophy, which can 
perhaps be characterized as “analytical philosophy in the (post) 
Rawlsian tradition” – the sort of philosophy that is 
predominantly taught by most members of philosophy 
departments in the USA and UK. The present contribution 
attempts to build this link. We start with a question in the 
province of computer or information ethics, namely “when is the 
extraction of value from data unjust?”, and provide an answer 
  
1 Perhaps the earliest occurrence of this claim dates back to 2007, in Michael 
Palmer, “Data Is the New Oil,” ANA Marketing Maestros, November 3, 2006, 
http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html. The claim or 
some variation of it has been repeated countless times since, for instance see: 
“The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,” The 
Economist, May 6, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-
data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-
resource. 
2 James H. Moor, “What Is Computer Ethics?,” Metaphilosophy 16, no. 4 
(October 1, 1985): 266–75. 
3 Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
D 
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which relies on concepts from Rawls’s theory. 
Although the argument here is driven by an analysis of two 
case studies (freedom of speech on digital platforms and the 
economics of big data) and for that reason may be classified as a 
paper in “applied philosophy” (whatever that means), we cannot 
avoid spending some words of the more “meta-theoretical” 
question of what type of concepts of political philosophy need to 
be invoked, in order to identify the normative facts at stake. In 
other words, we cannot simply take Rawls’s two famous 
principles of justice and  apply them to information and 
communication technology (ICT). Prior to doing that, it is 
absolutely essential to explain how the basic concepts  of a 
Rawlsian theory of justice might  apply to the social and 
technological domain in question. To do so, we must spend some 
words on the fundamental concepts of the Rawlsian analysis of 
social justice. Thus, a significant part of this paper is devoted to 
tackling questions of a more methodological, than practical, 
nature. 
The paper consists of three sections: section 1, in which we 
explain why a certain entity enabled/constituted by a certain 
deployment of ICT infrastructure, namely the “dominant internet 
platform”, is a subject of social justice in the Rawlsian sense; and 
section 2, in which we present Rawls’s principles of justice as 
criteria to evaluate internet platforms, regarded as institutions, just 
or unjust. Finally, in section 3, we considers two case studies 
(communication over YouTube and Facebook and the economic 
exploitation of data by Google search) and analyze them from the 
point of view of Rawls’s First and Second Principles of Justice. 
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I 
Data is the new oil and the institution governing its 
extraction and transformation is the digital platform 
The lead question in this paper is “when is the extraction of 
value from data just”? First of all let us consider the 
presupposition implicit in this claim: that data are analogous to 
raw material resources, which only acquire direct value in use, 
after they are extracted and processed in specific ways. Oil, for 
example, must be converted into plastic, chemicals, etc. Data, by 
analogy, must be “broken down” and “analyzed” to generate 
“insight”. Insights that may be gleaned from data span across a 
wide variety of different area. In the business sphere, where the 
analysis of “big data” found one of the first realms of 
application,4 data have been collected and analyzed for the sake 
of improving services and their delivery, or of personalized 
marketing. The infamous case of Target, which figured out a teen 
was pregnant from her shopping pattern, and alarmed her 
oblivious parents by sending personalized advertisement to her 
  
4 The concept of “big data” refers to data that are produced in very large 
quantities (e.g. not from a sample of the population of interest, but from the 
entire population) and are recorded in very short intervals, if not continuously. 
Finally, big data are often heterogeneous data, e.g. GPS data together with heart 
beat data. The main technological enabler of big data have been cloud services. 
The question “how big must be big data in order to count as big data?” does 
not have a clear answer. It is neither the sheer size of the data, nor whether or 
not they overcome the possibilities of analysis given at a specific technological 
stage, that defines this. Rather, what (most) people seem to have in mind when 
they talk about big data is a certain domain of applications, that only become 
possible when you are dealing with vast amount of data produced steadily, 
such as the identification of significant patterns, which may not be detectable 
with a lower quantity of data. See Luciano Floridi, “Big Data and Their 
Epistemological Challenge,” Philosophy & Technology 25, no. 4 (December 1, 
2012): 435–37.  
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home, testifies the power, as well as the risks, of such methods.5 
Other insights that can be gleaned from data concern mobility 
patterns (from GPS devices and cell phone data), health and 
wellness (from fitness devices of all kinds, including wearable 
health monitors), and epidemiology, such as detecting the early 
emergence of a disease, or monitoring the spatio-temporal evolu- 
tion of anti-vaccination sentiment.6  
Indeed, the centrality of insight, considered as the main value 
that technology adds to data, was already stated clearly in the first 
occurrence of the oil analogy on the web7. This analogy – with 
insight as the intermediate product by virtue of which data 
acquire value – still appears defensible. Data has no value except 
insofar as it is organized, or represented (e.g. visualized), or 
analyzed, in such a way as to lead to insight. It is in this vein that 
we must read this observation by internet (legal) scholar 
Lawrence Lessig, against the simple-minded accusation that 
  
5 Kashmir Hill, “How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before 
Her Father Did - Forbes,” Forbes, February 16, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-
out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/. 
6 Although Google Flu, the Google algorithm to predict the spread of flu 
epidemics based on Google searches, was eventually revealed to be flawed, 
similar methods have been used leading to better results. See David Lazer et 
al., “The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis,” Science 343, no. 
6176 (March 14, 2014): 1203–5, doi:10.1126/science.1248506; David J. McIver 
and John S. Brownstein, “Wikipedia Usage Estimates Prevalence of Influenza-
like Illness in the United States in near Real-Time,” PLoS Comput Biol 10, no. 4 
(2014): e1003581; Marcel Salathé and Shashank Khandelwal, “Assessing 
Vaccination Sentiments with Online Social Media: Implications for Infectious 
Disease Dynamics and Control,” PLoS Comput Biol 7, no. 10 (2011): e1002199.     
7 Michael Palmer, “Data Is the New Oil.” 
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Google is simply a parasite deriving value from the data of its 
users:8 
In the same sense you could say that all of the value in the Mona Lisa 
comes from the paint, that Leonardo da Vinci was just a ‘parasite’ upon the 
hard work of the paint makers. That statement is true in the sense that but 
for the paint, there would be no Mona Lisa. But it is false if it suggests that 
da Vinci wasn’t responsible for the great value the Mona Lisa is.9  
The Mona Lisa analogy draws attention to the fact that, just as 
there are agents who are responsible for the extraction of oil and 
its transformation into more commonly usable resources, there 
are also agents involved in the generation of insights (the 
“intermediate” product with economic value) from data (the raw 
resource). But does it follow that the companies doing the “hard 
work” of organizing and analyzing the data, justly extract all the 
economic value from the data that they can, given current laws? 
In his recent book Blood Oil10, Leif Wenar has argued that, in 
order to ethically evaluate the choices and attitudes concerning 
the global supply chain of all kinds of goods and products, we 
must direct our attention to the institutions (e.g. property and 
exchange) that enable the extraction and use of raw resources and 
their normative justification. By analogy, we argue that in order to 
assess the justice of the extraction of value from data – e.g. in 
order to implicitly morally condemn Google by describing it as a 
“parasite” – we should direct our attention to the institutions 
  
8 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015), 86. 
9 Lawrence Lessig, ed., Remix Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 128. 
10 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World 
(Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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enabling the economic agents who derive value from data to do 
so, and to do it so efficiently.   
What are institutions? The political philosopher John Rawls 
introduced the concept of the “basic structure” of society, 
referring to “the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation”11. Rawls provides 
several examples of institutions that belong to the basic structure 
of society, such as familiar forms of taxation12 (income or value 
added taxes, which are typically known in advance by each 
individual involved in exchanges). Other institutions of the basic 
structure are family law (concerning marriage and its dissolution, 
including obligations to provide for the offspring)13, rules 
concerning the public funding of elections and restrictions to 
campaign contributions14, private property and its inheritance15, 
the legal principles regulating freedom of the press and access to 
the media, including for political organizations16; by analogy we 
may add laws concerning libel, entrepreneurship (such as 
corporate and bankruptcy law) and intellectual property rights.  
The basic structure is, argues Rawls, the primary subject of 
social justice because it is the only system of norms that can 
achieve background justice. Background justice is a stable, self-
sustaining system with sufficiently predictable outcomes to 
ground a reasonable moral evaluation. A system of rules must be 
  
11 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 6. 
12 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 51. 
13 Ibid., 162–63. 
14 Ibid., 149. 
15 Ibid., 114–15. 
16 Ibid., 111–14, 149–50. 
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self-sustaining in the sense that it must have a definite tendency 
to generate certain goods and avoid producing certain ills, that is 
not undermined by the cumulative effects of the individual 
actions enabled by it. For example, the rules of football have a 
definite tendency to produce certain goods (enjoyment for the 
viewers, athletic prowess and dexterity for the players, team spirit) 
that is not undermined by the individual actions of football 
players in the field. Football can only achieve this result thanks to 
“safeguard rules” (e.g. about fouls and their punishment) that 
limit the anti-social tendencies otherwise elicited by rules 
incentivizing competition. Rawls regards the basic structure of 
society as a similar system of rules: 
Suppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that social circumstances 
and people’s relationships to one another should develop over time in 
accordance with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored. 
Straightaway we need an account of when agreements are free and the 
social circumstances under which they are reached fair. In addition, while 
these conditions may be fair at an earlier time, the accumulated results of 
many separate and ostensibly fair agreements, together with social trends 
and historical contingencies, are likely in the course of time to alter citizens’ 
relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for free and fair 
agreements no longer hold. The role of institutions that belong to the basic 
structure is to secure just background conditions against which the actions 
of individuals and associations take place.17 
The basic structure is “a shaper of actions, then, but it is also a 
dispenser of goods”18. Institutions shape actions because, just as 
the rules awarding victory in football, they elicit productive 
behavior, and enable social coordination through which goods 
  
17 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 265–66. 
18 A. J. Julius, “Basic Structure and the Value of Equality,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 31, no. 4 (2003): 333. 
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can be produced, even in the absence of a central planner. They 
dispense goods because they also include rules affecting how the 
benefits of social institutions are distributed.  
Rawls provides two conceptual criteria as to why the basic 
structure is “basic”. First, it is basic in the logical sense. Justice of 
the basic structure logically comes before the evaluation of 
individual acts of justice. It is the way in which individual actions 
add up, not the individual act taken in isolation, which produces 
the consequences that are most relevant from the point of view 
of all the persons affected. For example, returning money to a 
villain may appear contrary to human happiness, and yet the 
institutions of promise and property, as a whole, tend to be 
beneficial19. The institutional view of acts can be used to justify 
singular acts that may appear contrary to benevolence, but are 
actually just. It can, on the other hand, also show why actions that 
appear just in isolation, actually build up to have effects that make 
society unjust. For example, individual exchanges of legitimately 
owned property between consenting adults may appear (to some) 
obviously legitimate and fair, in so far as they are voluntary and 
mutually advantageous. Only a consideration of tendencies 
enabled by the institution of property and unfettered exchange as 
a whole can reveal that the accumulated effects of such act can be 
to concentrate power in few hands and expose the least fortunate 
individuals to domination and exploitation20. We find again, here, 
an analogy with the extraction of value from oil: the undesirable 
long-term effects of each commercial transaction concerning oil 
  
19 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (Oxford University Press, 2000), bks. 3, Part I, Sections 1-6. 
20 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 53; Miriam Ronzoni, “The Global Order: A Case of 
Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 37, no. 3 (June 1, 2009): 229–56, doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01159.x. 
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and oil-derived products are not visible if one focuses on 
individual transactions. But the oil-centered economy as a whole 
– the exchange network involving different economic agents each 
pursuing different social and economic goals – contributes to the 
“resource course” of the resource-rich countries, by sustaining 
corrupt and violent regimes as a wholly predictable byproduct of 
such markets.21 
Second, basic institutions have a “profound and pervasive 
influence on the persons who live under its institutions”22. This 
influence can emerge as attitudes of respect for all in democratic 
society or of reverence and submission in rigid hierarchical 
societies; it can emerge as the fact that self-esteem is grounded in 
independence or in being singled out for special treatments by 
arbitrary powers; it can emerge as a favorable attitude to risk, 
innovation and entrepreneurship and the appreciation of open 
borders. In other words, basic institutions are basic not only 
because they affect the general expectations of which goods will 
be produced and by whom, but also because they influence 
individual values, preferences, expectations, what is commonly 
regarded as honorable behavior, a subject worthy of discussion, 
and just.23 
Having introduced Rawls’s concept of the “basic structure of 
society”, our next question is to what relation does information 
and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure have with it. 
Are ICT infrastructure goods or resources that the basic structure of 
society distributes? Are they social primary goods in the sense of the 
first formulation of Rawls’s theory, namely goods such that it is 
  
21 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World 
(Oxford University Press, 2015), chap. I and II. 
22 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 55. 
23 Ibid. 
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rational for each individual to want more rather than less of 
them?24 Our thesis is that at least some ICT infrastructures are 
themselves institutions. The first step in this argument, is to 
introduce the concept of a dominant internet platform.  Having 
done that, we argue that dominant influence internet platforms 1) 
are institutions, and 2) that they belong to the basic structure of 
society.  
 To define a dominant internet platform, let us first define: 
A) internet information platform: an implementation of 
information and communication technologies that 
enables, amplifies, or provides structure to the exchange 
of information from a given source to one or more 
platform user. 
B) internet communication platform: an implementation of 
information and communication technologies that 
enables, amplifies, or gives structure to the exchange of 
information between two or more platform users. 
With these two concepts in mind, we can define a dominant 
internet platform: 
Dominant internet platform = (def)  
an internet (information and/or communication) 
platform which:  
a. enables or sustains the generation and distribution of 
goods of significant value  
b. has a profound and pervasive influence on the life of 
all or most persons in society. 
  
24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 54–55. 
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We shall now argue that dominant internet (information 
and/or communication) platforms, as here defined, belong to the 
basic structure of society in Rawls’s sense. There are two steps in 
this argument: the first is ontological, and the second is 
normative. The first, ontological, question concerns whether 
internet platforms are the kind of entities  - i.e. institutions25 -  
that can possible be considered as constituents of society’s basic 
structure. The second, normative, concerns whether the 
institutions characterized as “dominant internet platforms” are 
sufficiently important to deserve being considered not only 
institutions, but elements of a Rawlsian basic structure. 
Yochai Benkler analyzed the internet as an information 
environment consisting of three different layers: 1) the physical 
infrastructure, comprising, among other things, the computers 
and the wires connecting them, 2) the logical infrastructure, 
comprising all software, and 3) the third layer comprising the 
content that is created or exchanged by means of these 
infrastructures.26 Similarly internet platforms qua entities 
populating the internet can be described as assemblages involving 
the three layers distinguished above, for example, Google’s 
servers distributed in a few datacenters all over the world, the 
software running on these servers, and the information provided 
by Google users and stored in them. Is what Benkler labels 
“logical infrastructure” – i.e. software – the kind of entity that can 
be considered an institution in the Rawlsian sense, given the 
  
25 The definition of this term is not univocal. Clearly, here we are interested in 
the question whether dominant internet platforms are social institutions in the 
sense relevant to Rawls’s definition of the basic structure. 
26 Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures 
of Regulation toward Sustainable Commons and User Access,” Federal 
Communications Law Journal 52 (2000 1999): 561. 
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flexible way in which Rawls uses the term (including, that is, not 
only legal institutions but also social norms)? 
Let us begin with the first question. Famously, Lawrence 
Lessig has claimed that “code is law.”27 Lessig classifies software 
under the broader category of architecture: he claims that 
architectures, both physical and software ones, influence people’s 
behavior in a way that is complementary to law and social norms, 
for example by making certain options much easier to be taken 
than other28. Architectures differ from legal and social norms in 
that, argues Lessig, they do not have to be understood in order to 
affect an individual’s behavior29. In our view, what software 
architectures of internet platforms and social norms have in 
common is more important than what sets them apart. Moreover, 
the software running digital platform is closer to law and social 
norms than physical infrastructure, from a very important point 
of view. Rule-governed behavior, which is sustained by both 
positive law and social norms, constitutes roles, to which duties 
and rights are attached30. For example, the rules of football 
constitute the role of the goal keeper. The rules of democratic 
politics constitute passive and active electorate. The rules of 
government define the function of governments and political 
offices. The persons who occupy roles defined by the rules of 
football, democratic politics, and government acquire specific 
  
27 Lawrence Lessig, Code, 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
28 Ibid. 
29 One can legitimately doubt whether this distinction is valid. For example, it 
may be argued that legal code also affects the persons who do not understand 
the law, in so far as these individuals can be physically coerced (e.g. by police 
forces, or the military) to act in ways that are compatible with the rights and 
prohibitions that legally apply to them.  
30 Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics 123, no. 2 (2013): 202–29. 
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rights, immunities, privileges and duties, which are conditions 
that enable them to operate in those roles.31 
The code running internet information and/or 
communication platforms works in a similar way: it not only 
creates new goods, but also new roles characterized by specific 
functions, attached to role-specific rights, limitations, immunities 
and privileges. Not only the registered user with a profile, but 
also the anonymous users, can be understood as roles defined in 
software and authorized to interact with information and other 
individuals in specific ways but not others. Some aspects of the 
roles operating in internet platforms are normally also defined in 
legal terms (in a platform service’s terms and conditions), but what 
makes these norms effective is, in large part, their realization 
through the software architecture. A significant chunk of the 
software running in internet platforms is meant to operate an 
architecture of roles with specific rights and privileges attached, 
and at least this part of software can be appropriately considered 
an institution in Rawls’s sense.  
The above hopefully suffices to persuade the reader that 
software, or at least a significant part of the software operating in 
internet platforms, can be regarded as an institution in the sense 
which is relevant for Rawls’s theory. The next step in the 
argument is to show that dominant internet platforms are not 
merely institutions, but constituents of the basic structure of 
society. There are two criteria to determine whether they are, 
which correspond to the two reasons provided by Rawls why the 
basic structure of society should be considered the first subject of 
justice. First, software platforms must be capable of generating 
and sustaining important goods, through coordinating (via 
  
31 Ibid. 
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incentives and counter-incentives) individual actions enabled by 
rules. Second, that they must have a pervasive influence on all or 
most individuals in society. The question is whether it is possible, 
at least in principle, for software-governed platforms to fulfill 
these two criteria.  
We believe this is in fact a concrete possibility. A 
predominantly used search engine, for example, provides structured 
collections of information and enables intelligent access to it (think 
again about the Leonardo-paint producer analogy). Efficiently 
organized and intelligently accessible information on the web is 
an emerging benefit made possible by a multitude of disparate 
atoms of individual behavior channeled, incentivized, and 
coordinated through the software of a dominant information 
platform. Each individual search contributes to improving the 
algorithms that ranks results by relevance, by sending feedback 
signals the platform, the moment the customer clicks through, or 
discards, a search result. Moreover, the data collected can be used 
to produce insights: for example, individual searches may 
contribute to generate user profiles, that are valuable assets for e-
commerce. Structured information, selective access, and insight 
are all essential resources in the current economy. Without these 
goods, citizens would drown in the information made available 
on the world wide web, and be unable to use it profitably, and 
companies would not be able to exploit any of the opportunities 
of internet connectivity to reach their customers. 
The second criterion is that the basic structure has a profound 
and pervasive influence on the persons who are engaged with 
 it.  The first question to ask if it is conceptually possible for an 
internet platform to be dominant in this sense, or in other words, 
if the concept of a dominant internet platform is a contradiction 
in terms. This is tantamount to showing that the concept of 
“being an internet platform” and the concept of “being 
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dominant” (in the sense in question) can conceivably be realized by 
the same entity. Or in other words, we will argue that it is at least 
conceptually possible for internet platforms to be dominant.   
Imagine a society in which the “ever-increasing pervasiveness 
of ICTs” and the “blurring of the distinction between reality and 
virtuality”32 entails that information sought and exchanged online 
can potentially affect all spheres of social life. Thus, if all or most 
citizens use the same search engine in such society, the search 
engine can steer human behavior in a profound and pervasive 
way, depending on the information it shows. The first page of 
search results about a person, displayed on a dominant search 
platform will, for example, define the reputation of a person in 
that society, for a large swath of internet users who may never 
have a second chance to acquire information about her. A book 
or website, whose content may affect the way persons think 
about their own lives or their society, may disappear from the 
public space, by virtue of not appearing among search results, or 
by appearing after too many other results. If customers 
predominantly rely on a single search engine to seek information 
about goods and services, the companies serving such customers 
in highly competitive markets cannot simply afford to disappear 
from search results. It is also at least conceivable to have a society 
in which almost every person uses the same social networking 
website. In this conceivable scenario, the information distributed 
by the website can have deep and pervasive social and 
psychological effects on most individuals. By channeling personal 
information and allowing it to reach many persons engaged in 
real-life interactions with the subject, the impact of any desirable 
  
32 Luciano Floridi, “Introduction,” in The Onlife Manifesto, ed. Luciano Floridi 
(Springer International Publishing, 2015), 1–3, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04093-
6_1. 
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or undesirable piece of information would be widely amplified. 
Violating intimacy by leaking unauthorized visual content, for 
instance, is always undesirable, but it must have worse social and 
psychological consequences if it reaches the persons most likely 
to affect the offline life of the victim.  
Finally, we can imagine a society in which all the important 
decisions and opinions of people in power and people with large 
amounts of capital (economic, cultural, or social)33 are 
communicated through a social networking website. The formal 
constraints of the website – the rules about how information 
must be conveyed in it, e.g. how short or large the message, how 
links between pieces of information are established and made 
visible – may, in such hypothetical society, have an effect on the 
nature of political debate.  
The relevant concept of “profound and pervasive effect” on 
citizens can be made more precise by invoking Rawls’s concept 
of the “two fundamental moral powers”, that is to say, capacities. 
The first moral power is the “sense of justice”, which is the 
capacity of contributing to defining terms of mutual coexistence 
and respecting them if reasonable. The second is a “conception 
of the good”, that is the potential to pursue and revise a view of 
what is valuable in life34. A dominant internet platform is, by 
definition, an internet (communication and/or information) 
platform that affects the two moral powers of most citizens.  
We have argued that an internet platform can, as a matter of 
conceptual possibility at least, be the sort of thing that (a) sustains 
the generation and distribution of goods of significant value and 
  
33 Mike Savage et al., Social Class in the 21st Century, A Pelican Introduction 
(London: Penguin, 2015). 
34 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 18–19. 
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(b) has a profound and pervasive influence on all or most persons 
in society. How widespread the use of an internet platform must 
be – how dominant its position in the market it serves – for it to 
count as dominant, is difficult to determine precisely. In ethics 
and normative political philosophy we must satisfy ourselves with 
concepts which have fuzzy boundaries. The same is true, or so it 
may seem, of other institutions. A person can live as a hermit in 
the desert and be unaffected by the institution of property, or 
taxation. What percentage of the population must live as 
property-less hermits before property ceases to be a basic 
institution? We have introduced the concept of a dominant 
(information and/or communication) platform to capture an 
entity with characteristics similar to those of major social 
institutions considered by Rawls.  
We therefore conclude that the concept of dominant internet 
platform is not logically contradictory and that, when they exist, 
dominant internet platforms belong to the basic structure of a 
society. In section 3, we will analyze some case-studies and argue 
that it is plausible to claim that some privately owned, 
commercially provided platforms, are dominant internet 
platforms in the sense defined here. 
We claim that dominant internet platforms are proper extension 
of society’s basic structure; they belong to it since their influence 
– by definition – can hardly be avoided by anyone. Because many 
individuals cannot help but relying on dominant internet 
platforms, these algorithmically organized entities – irrespective 
of whether they are organized as private companies, cooperatives, 
publicly owned companies, or some other form of institution – 
must be considered fundamental social institutions. If that is the 
case, we argue, then Rawls’s principles of justice for society’s 
basic structure applies to them. But what are these principles of 
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justice, and how are they justified? This will be the question of 
the next section. 
 
II 
Rawls’s principles of justice as a framework for evaluating 
justice in the basic structure 
Rawls’s theory of justice applies to institutions forming 
society’s basic structure. That is to say, it also applies to dominant 
internet platforms, if our previous argument is correct. Principles 
of justice provide criteria that allow one to sort institutions into 
just and unjust ones. Rawls’s theory consists of two main 
principles: 
FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
SECOND PRINCIPLE 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle,35 and 
  
35 Rawls’s “just saving principle” deals with relations of justice between 
different generations. We will not explore the role of this principle in the 
application to big data and its balance with the Difference Principle 
(concerning justice for a single generation). A more encompassing evaluation 
of the justice of internet platforms must consider the intergenerational aspect, 
since a lot of the value of data is not fully realized, but only potential, and 
therefore potentially more valuable or harmful for future generations than 
present ones. Thus, distributive justice question concern not only the way in 
which such value is distributed across members of the same generation, but 
also between members of different generations.  
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(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.36 
Part (a) of the second principle is called “the Difference 
Principle”, perhaps the most important contribution of Rawls to 
the history of ideas. Part (b) of the Second Principle is the 
principle according to which person’s life chances ought to be 
similar, when persons have similar natural abilities and 
motivations (or ambitions), irrespective of the influence of their 
initial social class.  
Rawls’s justification of the two principles relies on three 
leading ideas. The first is that persons should be conceived as 
“free and equal”. Persons are “free and equal” in the sense that 
they have enough of the two “moral powers” (introduced above) 
to deserve equal respect. A just society is one that protects and 
promotes the moral powers of all citizens fairly. 
Rawls’s second main idea is that fairness should be conceived as 
the result of an impartial procedure, the so-called Original Position 
(OP). Parties in the OP choose the basic norms of social 
cooperation behind an imaginary “veil of ignorance”, a condition 
in which they ignore the specific circumstances of their society 
and their personal traits and circumstances. Since they ignore all 
morally irrelevant facts (e.g. facts about their individual 
characteristics), parties in the OP are forced to adopt an impartial 
  
36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. Rawls also argues (controversially, it turned 
out) that the first principle should have lexical priority with respect to the 
second, meaning that no infringement of the equal liberty principle should be 
ever tolerated as a means to realizing fair opportunity or to maximize the 
benefit for the least advantaged position. However, he also argues that this 
ordering of the principles only obtains as long as basic needs are met. Unequal 
rights could be extraordinarily and temporarily satisfied if strictly necessary to 
satisfy basic needs.  
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point of view. How would impartial choosers choose? According 
to Rawls, the two moral powers are so important, that it would be 
rational for a party in the OP to seek the sufficiently high level of 
protection for the moral powers in the worst possible 
circumstances. Failing to plan against the worst-case scenario in 
the OP is equivalent to not taking one’s two moral powers 
seriously enough, since under the “veil of ignorance” one cannot 
exclude that the worst-case scenario is, in fact, the actual one. 
This is how equal fundamental rights are justified: one should 
select the right of freedom of conscience that it would be in one’s 
interest no matter how popular one’s religion happens to be in 
reality. This would clearly be one of equal freedom of conscience 
for all religions. Similarly, one would have to choose norms 
concerning race and discrimination assuming one belongs to the 
disfavored race, which would be one treating races equally, or, 
when equal treatment cannot be guaranteed, allowing unequal 
treatment that would benefit the worst off race and generate the 
preconditions for equality. 
Let us now consider the Second Principle, concerning socio-
economic justice. Here again social arrangements are evaluated 
taking as a guide the possibility of the worst-case scenario, which, 
for socio-economic justice, amounts to being a member of the 
group with the least opportunities and the worst expectations of 
income and wealth. Rawls argues that, should one select the 
norms that it would be rational to select in the worst-case 
scenario, one would not choose a principle of distribution of 
income and wealth that requires strict equality. Rather, one would 
choose a principle that justifies inequalities when (and only when) 
thanks to them, the expectations for the worst-off group are 
better than under a more equal distribution. (This possibility 
exists when the introduction of inequalities in the distribution of 
income and wealth goes hand by hand with an expansion of the 
resources generated by social cooperation. If a cake gets bigger 
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when it is divided more unequally, the smallest slice in the 
unequal distribution can be bigger than any equal slice.)  
The Difference Principle could be interpreted as a principle 
requiring a form of reciprocity in inequality: unequal expectations 
are just only when there is no equal arrangement under which the 
least advantaged members are as well-off, as in the unequal one.37  
In the next section, we will illustrate by means of case-studies 
how Rawlsian principles of justice can be applied to a Rawlsian 
basic structure including dominant internet platforms.  
 
III 
Are there, in fact, dominant internet platforms? 
The analysis of the following real-world cases is meant to 
achieve two goals: first to show that some existing internet 
platforms are plausibly taken to be dominant internet platform in 
the sense stipulated above. Second, to illustrate the relevance of 
Rawlsian principles of justice to evaluate the justice of dominant 
internet platforms.  
 
 
  
37 What about if the benefits for the more advantaged members neither add 
nor detract from the benefits from the least advantaged ones? Rawls assumes 
that this is not likely to happen (close-knitness assumption, Ibid., 71). If close-
knitness does not obtain, different interpretations of the Difference Principle 
are possible (and justifiable in the context of other Rawlsian claims), 
depending on the different emphasis placed on the idea of reciprocity or the 
Original Position argument. See Philippe Van Parijs, “Difference Principles,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, 
U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 200–240. 
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Political speech on YouTube 
Towards the end of September, 2017, MEP Marietje Schaake 
uploaded a series of videos on YouTube concerning the debate in 
the Parliament on the new law on European trade for good that 
are used in torture and the death penalty. According to the MEP, 
YouTube removed one of her video with a recording of the 
opinion of the Commissioner for European Trade, Cecila 
Malmström. YouTube’s reasons for removal was that the video 
was “flagged for review” by other users and that YouTube 
determined that YouTube Community Guidelines were violated.38 
MEP Schaake filed a “video appeal”, where she had to argue in 
one sentence why the video needed to stay up.39 After she 
publicized the incident through Twitter40, Google reached out to 
one of her parliamentary assistants to smooth it out and revert on 
the decision. The video was back online after four hours.  
This case illustrates how the combination of software, terms 
of use, and social norms, powered by an internet platform 
(YouTube), enables a new form of control of political speech. In 
this case, YouTube’s software-mediated practices and their 
  
38 “Community Guidelines - YouTube,” accessed October 26, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html. 
39 “When YouTube Took down My Video,” Marietje Schaake, accessed October 
26, 2016, https://www.marietjeschaake.eu/en/when-youtube-took-down-my-
video; “YouTube Takes Down European Parliament Video On Stopping 
Torture For ‘Violating Community Guidelines,’” Techdirt., accessed October 
26, 2016, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20161006/00445835727/youtube-takes-
down-european-parliament-video-stopping-torture-violating-community-
guidelines.shtml. 
40 Marietje Schaake, “Danger of Automated Content Removal: YouTube Took 
down My Video of the Anti-Torture Debate in the European Parliament!,” 
microblog, @MarietjeSchaake, (October 5, 2016), 
https://twitter.com/MarietjeSchaake/status/783699031746867204. 
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policies about content removal inadvertently or intentionally 
helped a crowd silence a parliamentarian who was posting about 
democratic discussions of torture. The case illustrates both the 
potentially deep and wide-ranging impact of an internet platform 
(which makes it dominant according to our definition) and how 
the Rawlsian Theory of Justice can be saliently applied to it. 
YouTube is a dominant platform because it can have a 
significant influence on the moral power of reasonableness of 
citizens – their capacity to judge what is just and unjust. Whether 
a content is accessible or not on YouTube can have far reaching 
consequences: according to the company itself, it has over a 
billion users and reaches more 18-34 and 18-49 year-olds – a 
significant fraction of the electorate – than any cable network in 
the U.S41. Possibly the statistics concerning Europe are not that 
different. If users in this cohort remain faithful as they grow older 
and new cohorts replicate the same use patterns, the overall reach 
and influence of the platform is going to grow. The content of 
the video involves a textbook definition of political speech, which 
is a kind of speech that can have a widespread and profound 
effect on everyone, by affecting a society’s public decisions. It 
could be argued that decisions concerning content on YouTube 
affect everyone in society, or almost so. First of all, even non-
users can be indirectly influenced by opinions formed by 
accessing YouTube, via their social connections to non-users. 
Second, if the content available (or not) on YouTube affects the 
public conversation about public issues it can influence political 
decisions that are binding to all. If YouTube can affect everyone 
in society, also the non-users, and if it can affect the way in which 
  
41 “Statistics – YouTube,” accessed October 26, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html. 
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citizen’s sense of justice operates, then it qualifies as a dominant 
internet platform based on our definition. 
 
Napalm Girl and Facebook 
“Napalm Girl” is widely regarded as the most iconic 
documentary photograph of the Vietnam war, including a naked 
9-year-old Kim Phúc running away from a Napalm attack. 
Norwegian author Tom Egeland, working for the newspaper 
Afterposten included this picture in the context of a display of 
seven photographs that changed war history. Facebook promptly 
removed the picture, since it shows Kim Phúc’s naked genitals, in 
violation of Facebook’s Community Guidelines. Subsequently the 
editor of Afterposten wrote an open letter to Facebook that 
circulated widely among media outlets and on the blogosphere. 
Erna Solber, the Conservative prime minister of Norway, voiced 
criticism on Facebook’s choice on Facebook itself. Facebook 
reverted its previous decision, which pointed out at the difficulty 
of distinguishing between different instances of posting 
photographs of nude children, the day after the publication of the 
open letter.42 
  
42 Espen Egil Hansen Sjefredaktør, “Dear Mark Zuckerberg. I Shall Not 
Comply with Your Requirement to Remove This Picture.,” Aftenposten, 
accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.aftenposten.no/article/ap-
604156b.html; NTB, “Norsk Forfatter Midlertidig Utestengt Fra Facebook 
Etter å Ha Postet Bilde Fra Vietnamkrigen,” Aftenposten, accessed October 26, 
2016, http://www.aftenposten.no/article/ap-603854b.html; Julia Carrie 
Wong, “Mark Zuckerberg Accused of Abusing Power after Facebook Deletes 
‘Napalm Girl’ Post,” The Guardian, September 9, 2016, sec. Technology, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/facebook-mark-
zuckerberg-napalm-girl-photo-vietnam-war; “Erna Solberg - Diary,” accessed 
October 26, 2016,  
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Plausibly enough, the emotional graphical content posted on 
Facebook (a child running away from the horrors of war) can be 
considered as an example of political speech of the kind that can 
contribute to the development of the sense of justice in the 
citizens. Afterposten is not an individual but a company that has 
with Facebook a commercial relationship, presumably regulated 
by a contract that secures very explicitly Facebook’s entitlement 
to apply its policies on the content transiting through its 
platform. Here we see another aspect of Facebook dominance. 
As the most widely used social network in many countries, it is 
not a platform where any newspaper of high-income countries 
can afford not to be. News outlets such as Afterposten, operating 
in a competitive environment, can only avoid Facebook at great 
risk for themselves.  
 
Breastfeeding and Facebook 
Finally, Facebook image censorship guidelines, leaked in 
2012,43 revealed that images of breastfeeding had to be taken 
down by moderators if the nipples were exposed. Facebook’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
https://www.facebook.com/ernasolberg/posts/10154351913481832; James 
Temperton, “Facebook Makes U-Turn on Decision to Censor an Iconic 
Vietnam War Photo,” WIRED UK, accessed October 26, 2016, 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-terror-of-war-vietnam-napalm-girl-
image-censored; Sam Levin and Julia Carrie Wong Luke Harding in London, 
“Facebook Backs down from ‘Napalm Girl’ Censorship and Reinstates 
Photo,” The Guardian, September 9, 2016, sec. Technology, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebook-reinstates-
napalm-girl-photo. 
43 Charles Arthur, “Facebook’s Nudity and Violence Guidelines Are Laid 
Bare,” The Guardian, February 21, 2012, sec. Technology, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/21/facebook-nudity-
violence-censorship-guidelines. 
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nipple policy could be charged of intentionally or inadvertently 
supporting corporate interests threatened by breastfeeding (e.g. 
powder milk industry), in so far as it limits the users’ exposition 
to pictures of woman breastfeeding. This may have an influence 
on women’s choices with respect to whether to breastfeed in 
public, or indeed breastfeed at all, and on their partners’ 
motivation to support them. Second, it sends all kinds of 
messages about gender role, in so far as men’s nipples, but not 
women’s, are permitted.44 Thus, the combination of Facebook 
software (for signaling content) and moderation rules is an 
institution of social cooperation with the power to influence the 
conceptions of what is good, appropriate, dignified (the second 
moral power, of “rationality”) of many individuals in societies 
where Facebook usage is widespread.  
We conclude that Facebook has the power to impose rules of 
social cooperation to significant portions of society. It achieves 
this influence through different stages. First, it affects those 
people who, due to their life goals, cannot afford not to use 
Facebook. The rules of the platform are – from the perspective 
of these persons – take-it-or-leave-it social institutions just as the 
rules of propriety and taxation. They are rules shaping their 
choices and distributing goods to them. Arguably, they are even 
more take-it-or-leave-it than rules of property and taxation since, 
to change the latter, constitutionally approved and familiar 
institutional mechanisms to change the institutions democratically 
exist. Second step: a platform like Facebook extends its influence 
to the rest of society because its users are a significant proportion 
of the total population and are enmeshed across all layers of 
  
44 Amar Toor, “Facebook Still Has a Nipple Problem,” The Verge, October 12, 
2016, http://www.theverge.com/2016/10/12/13241486/facebook-
censorship-breast-cancer-nipple-mammogram. 
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society. By virtue of this social connectedness, Facebook content 
moderation choices affect the public culture and the behavior of 
non-users as well. A proof of Facebook’s influence outside the 
private realm of active Facebook users is the large number of cases 
involving Facebook that are discussed outside Facebook (e.g. on 
the news).  
If Facebook and Youtube are dominant internet platforms, in 
many societies, then, they belong to the basic structures of those 
societies. Rawls’s Principles of Justice determine the justice of the 
basic structure, including the Facebook and YouTube platforms. 
We propose to analyze YouTube and Facebook as institutions to 
which the principle of the equal liberties applies. If that is the 
case, Facebook must guarantee equal protection of freedom of 
speech. 
Do YouTube and Facebook protect equality of freedom of 
speech? The above mentioned cases suggest that they rules create 
roles and opportunities for the exercise of arbitrary power, that 
end up conferring advantage to some parties to the detriment of 
other parties, inadvertently or intentionally. These roles are: a) the 
role of decision-makers in the company with the authority to 
dictate internal guidelines for removing online content, b) the role 
of the employees who must apply these guidelines, c) the role of 
the platform users who can notify alleged violations of the 
community guidelines. Each role plays a specific function and has 
specific rights and authorities attached to it. In fact, the platform 
policies about speech are decided non democratically, exercised 
mechanically and yet somehow arbitrarily, and provide poor 
protection of a the right to appeal against such decisions.  
Those who have designed the platforms, have not done so 
with the goal of protecting the ability of the users to challenge the 
platform decisions to a degree compatible with the protection of their 
moral powers. They have designed the platform to be compatible 
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with user satisfaction, which is necessary for profit (but only 
necessary to an extent actually modulated by the platform’s true 
dominance). User satisfaction and protection of the two moral 
powers are two different goals. There is no a-priori guarantee that 
the level of user satisfaction that Facebook needs, in order to be 
profitable, will be achieved by protecting everyone’s freedom of 
speech equally.  
In fact, as the above analysis show, the existing rules appear to 
confer more opportunities of communication to the weapon 
industry, the artificial milk industry, and those who think that 
showing female breasts in public is necessarily inappropriate, than 
to the persons opposing those views. 
We argue that, as a society moves online, the social norms and 
positive laws that were sufficient to guarantee equal freedom of 
speech in the absence of the dominant internet platforms can no longer 
be relied to fulfill this function. Existing safeguards – positive 
laws and social norms concerning speech and its regulation – 
have a limited reach in the new world of internet-based 
institutions. Constitutional rights may be framed ambiguously 
which makes it difficult to invoke them to protect online freedom 
of speech. Existing judicial procedures may have very uncertain 
outcomes and therefore be too difficult to enforce.  
The enforcement problem is a particularly serious one. Take 
the MEP Schaake case first. The story has a kind of happy ending 
with a tweet storm reaction and the overturning of the initial 
verdict from the moderators. But a less prominent (and affluent) 
user who may easily be victim of a similar violation would neither 
be able to engage the Twitter people to stir public uproar, nor to 
sustain a potentially burdensome court case against YouTube.45 
  
45 Moreover, Twitter could be purchased by the same company that owns 
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In the Napalm Girl case, again, Facebook arrives at a reasonable 
and timely judgment, but only after a significant reaction by the 
media and politics. Such reaction could be achieved by an 
established news outlet (an entity, almost by definition, with an 
above-the-norm capacity for public communication). But for all 
we know, there might have been many similar cases, involving 
ordinary Facebook users, that we have never heard of, simply 
because no response was elicited, and the decision of moderators 
was passively accepted. However, being a newspaper also exposes 
the agent in question to a particular vulnerability. Relationships 
between newspapers and Facebook are regulated by commercial 
contracts. The possibility to exercise data protection rights in the 
courts, while economically feasible for a newspaper, may be in 
this case be restricted by commercial clauses consented to.  
 
IV 
Inequalities generated by the internet 
Economic inequality in big data 
Internet is nowadays dominated by large companies, 
producing and controlling a huge amount of personal data as a 
collateral effect of providing their services through the internet. 
The technological innovations responsible for this are mainly the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
YouTube. Existing laws are unlikely to prevent such possibility specifically. 
Current competition and antitrust laws (on either side of the ocean) have a 
different rationale (consumer welfare) and are not applied for the purpose of 
protecting the constitutionally enshrined value of freedom of speech. We 
believe our arguments show that the purchase of Twitter by Alphabet or 
Facebook would be a threat of freedom of speech, but it is unclear whether a 
constitutional judge (on either side of the ocean) would see it in this way. Yet 
the substantive implications for freedom of speech are clear. 
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Internet and the smartphone, which provide access to a wide 
variety of services, such as maps, blogs, videos and internet 
searchers, every day, 24h a day, in real time, globally. As a side-
effect of interactions between platform companies and their 
customers, formidable amounts of data are collected.   
The data produced and controlled by platform owners are 
considered a “new asset class”.46 The ability to control and derive 
benefits from such assets is marked by significant inequalities. 
There is an inequality in the ability to collect and control these data, 
as the dominant internet platforms are uniquely positioned to do 
so. This unique position derives from the combination of 
different network effects that make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to compete against the first company that starts to benefit 
significantly from them. For example, it is hard to compete 
against Facebook offering the same product, if you start with a 
hugely inferior user base. For the number of users in the network 
– the number of potential "friends" you can reach adds value to 
the service provided.47  Google search benefits from a host of 
interlocking network effects: marketplace network effects 
  
46 World Economic Forum and Bain & Company, Inc., “Personal Data: The 
Emergence of a New Asset Class” (World Economic Forum, 2011). 
47 It might be objected that Google may soon face serious competition by 
Bing, the Microsoft powered search engine. This is the kind of exception that 
proves the rule: few companies are able to sustain the huge losses that 
Microsoft suffered for several years in order to get a chance to compete with 
Google, and even in this case the possibility of competition only exists because 
Microsoft can exploit market dominance in another market, that of operating 
systems. See, By Robert Cyran, “Microsoft Ought to Kick off Search for Bing 
Buyer,” Reuters Blogs, accessed April 4, 2016, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2011/07/22/microsoft-ought-to-
kick-off-search-for-bing-buyer/; Seth Fiegerman, “Microsoft’s Bing Search 
Engine Is Actually a Success,” Mashable, accessed April 4, 2016, 
http://mashable.com/2015/06/30/bing-not-losing-money/. 
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(advertisers affiliated with Google can access to the best profiled 
individuals, while each individual advertiser contributes its bit to 
the profiling), data network effects (if you have more data, you 
can more easily build a richer ecosystem of better services around 
each person), recruiting network effects (particularly on social 
networks, a larger user base attracts even more users), and 
feedback network effect (the behavior of users tells Google 
which search results are selected after typing a given search key - 
thus helping Google to identify the most fitting search results).48 
Due to these network effects, many markets of internet services 
(e.g. the search or social network markets) tend to be winner-
takes-all.49 
Google allows the activities of social cooperators to generate 
and distribute goods (intelligently organized information, insights, 
customer profiles), that would not exist independently of it and 
of the actions of individuals it enables, which is a typical feature 
of a dominant internet platform. These goods are then converted 
into wealth for some (through the legal mechanisms of 
intellectual property ownership), and opportunities for others. 
Second, Google has a profound and pervasive influence on the 
life of all or most persons in society. In many countries, Google 
is by far the most widely used search engine. Hence, it has the 
capacity to affect the reputation of individuals and commercial 
success of companies, as the “imaginary” platform introduced in 
  
48 This asymmetric relationship between those who collect, store and mine 
data and their targets is sometimes referred to as the “big data divide”. See 
Mark Andrejevic, “The Big Data Divide,” International Journal of Communication 8 
(2014): 1673–1689. 
49 See also Loi, M., P. Dehaye, and E. Hafen, “Towards Rawlsian “property-
owning democracy” through personal data platform cooperatives”, submitted 
manuscript. 
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section 1. If that is correct, the Second Principle of Justice applies 
to Google. What are the implications of this fact?  
The first is that Google is bound to respect the principle of 
Fair Equality of Opportunity. The original Rawlsian principle applies 
to persons and their chances of success. Arguably, however, the 
Fair Equality of Opportunity principle should also apply to 
business, also because behind businesses there are persons, who 
are largely affected by the success or lack of success of 
businesses. The internet version of the Fair Equality of 
Opportunity principle would be based on the following 
equivalence 
 
Individual’s chances of success à companies’ chances of success 
Initial position relative to social 
class à 
position relative to the 
economic interests of 
dominant internet platforms 
Similar talents à similar potential profitability 
Similar ambitions à similar ambitions 
 
Fair Equality of Opportunity for companies on the web, then, is 
the claim that: 
Equally ambitious and potentially profitable companies should 
have similar chances of success, irrespective of their relation to 
the economic interests of dominant internet platforms. 
The principle in question is a plausible requirement of fairness 
in commercial competition for companies in societies where a 
single internet platform dominates the search market. Customers 
have an interest to obtain services from companies that meet 
their needs and expectations; they do not have an interest in 
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solidifying the dominance of the dominant search engine. 
Moreover, the success of a company (and derivatively, of the 
persons who lead it or work on it) must not depend on its 
positive contribution to the solidification of entrenched players. 
Such a dependency would run afoul of Fair Equality of 
Opportunity, which is interpreted (by Rawls himself) as 
incompatible with the concentration of economic assets and 
powers in few hands, and requires anti-monopolistic measures50. 
That, of course, does not mean that Google should not charge 
for the ads it sells, that also appear on its search result page. 
Arguably, companies with similar potential profitability and 
similar ambitions (that is to say, operating in the same markets) 
normally have similar chances to buy ads. The real issue of justice 
concerns a company’s rank in the organic (that is, the unpaid) 
search results, those that are not for sale and that, for that reason, 
appear to be “meritocratically” assigned. For dominant internet 
platforms, realizing Fair Equality of Opportunity means an 
obligation to provide a level playing field for all companies 
competing for their users’ attention, without preferential 
treatment to own or allied companies and strategic handicapping 
of potential competitors. It is worth mentioning that some have 
accused Google of failing precisely on that count. Frank 
Pasquale’s The Black Box Society reports the allegation of 
Foundem, a UK company specialized in price comparisons.51 The 
uncontroversial facts of the case are the following: six months 
after its launch, Google blocked Foundem from appearing in its 
organic search results. Google and Foundem provide different 
justifications for this: according to Google, its algorithm had 
classified it as “ ‘a low-quality’ site, composed mainly of links to 
  
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 243 and 246. 
51 Pasquale, The Black Box Society, 67. 
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other sites”52. According to Foundem, Google did not come to 
such assessment based on impartial criteria. Foundem’s preferred 
explanation is that:  
If Google has no interest in an area, it will let an upstart be. But once it 
enters (or plans to enter) the market of a smaller finding service, it 
downranks that service to assure the prominence of its own offerings. 
(Major incumbents are not displaced lest their users revolt, so they usually 
retain their access to prime real estate.) If the smaller engine is a potential 
acquisition target, Google has another interest in suppressing traffic: to 
discourage its hope of succeeding independently. Like Pharaoh trying to 
kill off the baby Moses, it denies its rival the chance to scale. When a 
would-be purchaser controls significant access to its target’s potential 
customer base, overtures of interest are offers that can’t be refused.53  
Let us suppose that Foundem’s allegations, as reconstructed 
by Pasquale, are true54. We could explain the resulting injustice by 
  
52 Ibid. 
53 Pasquale, The Black Box Society. 
54 The recent fine levied against Google in the EU antitrust case (that Google 
will appeal against) is based on evidence of this kind of behavior. See Nicholas 
Hirst, “Wanted: Expert to Monitor Google’s Algorithm for €10 Million,” 
POLITICO, June 29, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/wanted-expert-to-
monitor-googles-algorithm-for-e10-million/.  Notice that Facebook has been 
brought to court by an app company for allegation of a similar anti-
competitive behavior. The former startup Six4Three maintains that Facebook 
used its power to grant or deny access to its customers’ personal data as a 
threat at the bargaining table with companies, such as Six4Three. Allegedly, 
Facebook’s command over the data of roughly one third of the world 
population allowed its managers to terminate the business of unwanted 
competitors, if they wanted to, or buy them at below market price, or to force 
them to purchase undesired commercial services from Facebook, such as 
sponsored ads on its mobile platform. See Cadwalladr, Carole, and Emma 
Graham-Harrison, “Zuckerberg Set up Fraudulent Scheme to ‘weaponise’ 
Data, Court Case Alleges.” The Guardian, May 24, 2018, sec. Technology. 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/24/mark-zuckerberg-
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appealing to the (modified) Fair Equality of Opportunity 
Principle. Seen as an institution, Google search includes two 
social roles with a potential conflict of interest: Google owners 
and search subjects (in this case, the company Foundem). The first 
role aims to protect and strengthen Google’s market share, while 
the second aims to reach their customers, and these two goals 
may not be aligned.  
If Google is a dominant internet platform then, according to 
our argument, there are limits to the extent that it can promote its 
own commercial interests. Not all means would be permitted: the 
company owning the dominant internet platform could only 
maximize its own profits through strategies constrained by the 
prior principle of justice of Fair Equality of Opportunity. Google 
– as the company that owns an arguably dominant internet 
platform – should arguably be prohibited to pursue its own 
commercial objectives by reducing the chances of success of a 
potential competitor.    
So far, we have analyzed justice in the dominant (search) 
internet platform in terms of the relationship between a particular 
set of search subjects (namely, companies) and the platform owners. 
Let us now turn to the relationship between the two roles of 
owners and users and let us consider the question of income and 
wealth inequality, the subject of Rawls’s Difference Principle. We must 
consider the roles created and sustained by Google search – 
regarded as an institution – in relation to how income and wealth 
are distributed between them. Google owners include a small 
number of owners with a significant proportion of the shares, 
who are extremely wealthy, and a large number of owners each 
owning few shares, who are predominantly middle- or high-
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income citizens with a capacity to save and invest in a public 
company, such as Google. On the other hand, there are the 
Google users, including everyone with a computer or a 
smartphone with internet connection, which is to say, excluding 
perhaps a significant proportion of elderly citizens, virtually 
everyone in societies where internet usage is widespread. Google 
users presumably have, on average, lower expectations of income 
and wealth than Google owners. Moreover, Google contributes 
to reinforce this inequality in so far as the distribution of benefits 
from that is concerned. The way Google does this is by extracting 
economic value from user-provided data and converting it to 
profits that are then paid to the owners of its shares. 
Notice that Rawls’ Difference Principle is actually not violated 
because Google’s owners are, as a group, much better off than 
Google’s users and Google, as an institution, contributes to 
reinforcing such inequality. In order to show a violation of the 
Difference Principle, more elements are needed. Justice, for 
Rawls, is not synonymous with the equal distribution of income 
and wealth. Rather, according to Rawls’s Difference Principle, the 
inequalities produced by the internet can be considered just if they 
cannot be removed without making least advantaged individual 
worse off in absolute terms. Rawls’s Difference Principle is only 
violated if Google users would be at least equally well off with 
services analogous to those offered by Google but provided 
within an alternative set of institutions, distributing the economic 
value of data more equally. Thus, Rawls’s Difference Principle 
directs our inquiry to assess the following empirical question: are 
there possible institutional/technological arrangements that can 
provide effective search services while generating more equal 
expectations of income and wealth from the data, in which the 
expectations of the search engine users are not worse in absolute 
terms? If the only way to achieve a more equal distribution of 
wealth from data were to deprive consumers of the highly 
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valuable service for searching information Google provides, 
making their expectations worse off in absolute terms, Google-
sustained inequality would be justified. If alternative 
arrangements are possible, where consumers have both access to 
valuable search services and where users are equally or better off 
than they are today thanks to alternative ways of distributing 
wealth from data, than the Google dominant platform for search 
is unjust, in that it violates the Difference Principle.  
At this stage in our argument, we lack the empirical 
information necessary to assess the truth of the above claim. Our 
purpose here is conceptual, not empirical, i.e. to reflect about the 
kind of criteria that ought to govern the assessment of justice in 
the extraction of value from data. What could greatly help a 
scientist’s ability to assess the Google dominant platform from 
the point of view of the Difference Principle is research about, 
and implementation of, alternative institutions for governing data 
provided by citizens in the search market.  
This is a field for interdisciplinary inquiry in which exciting 
innovations are taking place. Consortia such as the MyData 
movement,55 data cooperatives such as Healthbank56 and 
MIDATA.coop57 are proposing innovations in both corporate 
governance and software systems. In alternative institutional 
arrangements, search services would not be allowed to collect 
data about their users to redeploy them for any purpose, except 
  
55 “Homepage,” MyData 2016, accessed August 24, 2016, 
http://mydata2016.org. 
56 “Healthbank Innovation Ag, Baar,” accessed May 16, 2016, 
http://www.moneyhouse.ch/u/healthbank_innovation_ag_CH-
170.3.039.845-6.htm. 
57 “MIDATA.Coop | My Data - Our Health,” Midata, accessed May 16, 2016, 
https://www.midata.coop. 
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those strictly necessary to provide, monitor and improve their 
services. Individuals would have a legal right to demand and 
obtain a copy of all the data collected about them by internet 
services in a usable form58. In this way, data could be returned 
from dominant internet platforms to their users and controlled by 
users directly. Ordinary citizens would be empowered to derive 
value from data by new kinds of institutions, such as data 
aggregators and personal data management systems. These 
systems could be owned by internet users cooperatives such as 
Healthbank and MIDATA59, or technological start-ups with a 
different business model from the currently prevailing one, which 
consists in accessing as much user data as possible. These 
companies would develop business models in which they act as 
intermediaries or facilitators, that enable the internet user to 
control their data and profit from the data (for instance by 
pooling together the data of many individuals, in a way that is 
nowadays only achieved by providers of popular online services). 
  
58 Arguably, the coming European Data Protection Regulation goes some 
steps in this direction, in particular by virtue of the principle of data portability 
(Art. 20). See “Regulation on the Protection  of Natural  Persons  with Regard  
to the Processing  of Personal  Data and on the Free  Movement  of Such 
Data, and Repealing  Directive 95/46/EC  (General  Data Protection  
Regulation 2016/ 679)” (2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:
2016:119:TOC. Yet, the data portability principle does not really extend to the 
majority of data that internet companies are nowadays able to record and 
process, as it tries to balance the rights of the data controllers. It is also unclear 
whether it can be leveraged by consumers and companies to undermine the 
current hegemony as data collectors of large providers of services, or if it could 
even further entrench their dominance by selectively choosing beneficiaries of 
this portability. 
59 E. Hafen, D. Kossmann, and A. Brand, “Health Data Cooperatives – 
Citizen Empowerment:,” Methods of Information in Medicine 53, no. 2 (February 
11, 2014): 82–86, doi:10.3414/ME13-02-0051. 
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These technological and governance innovations could empower 
individuals to bargain, individually or collectively (in the case of 
the cooperative model), their own data with services or even 
income, in a way that is more informed and transparent. In this 
alternative data economy, providers of search or social 
networking services would lose most of their capacity to extract 
value from the data of their users and would have to change their 
business model into one in which they are paid for their services, 
either by individuals or cooperatives of internet users. But 
internet users would, for example, be able to derive income from 
their data, and after using some of this income to pay the services 
that used to be offered for free, they would totalize a net gain, on 
top of more agency in the overall data economy. 
Developments in this area are exciting. They suggest that there 
could be alternative arrangements, both legal and technological, 
able to sustain a tendency to equality, as opposed to the tendency 
to inequality promoted by a company like Google. Still, in this 
moment we do not know whether these alternative arrangements 
would really work and whether internet users would be better off, 
under them, then they are now, from the point of view of the 
Difference Principle.  
If the argument in this paper is correct, these developments 
are important not only because they are innovations, but also 
because they contribute to our normative knowledge. Given the 
way the Difference Principle works, we need to compare the 
present state of affairs to alternative possible arrangements in the 
data economy, in order to be able to assess whether the existing 
level of inequality they support is justified (because the least 
advantaged group would be worst off without it) or not justified 
(because a more egalitarian distribution that does not 
compromise expectations for the worst off group is possible). 
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V 
Conclusion 
The initial question of this paper is how to assess justice in the 
extraction of value from data. We start by assuming that the 
extraction of value from data is just, when the institution that 
enable this activity are just. We defend the following theses: 
1. that software should not be regarded simply as a 
distribuendum of justice, but rather as a social institution; 
2. that dominant internet platforms, human-software 
assemblages formed by software, legal arrangements, and 
the social norms constraining the behaviors of their users, 
are institutions of society’s basic structure; 
3. that dominant internet platforms ought to fulfill principles of 
social justice; 
4. that YouTube, Facebook, and Google Search are 
plausibly considered (relative to their position in many 
societies) dominant internet platforms; 
5. that YouTube, Facebook and Google Search are unjust 
institutions, if they violate Rawls’s Two Principles of 
Justice; 
6. that there are indications that YouTube, Facebook and 
Google search may violate these principles.  
Depending on the strength of considerations for thinking that 
these platforms are indeed dominant ones according to the 
definition provided and of considerations for thinking that they 
fail to satisfy the Rawlsian two Principles of Justice, we may come 
to the conclusion that these platforms are unjust institutions. If that 
is in fact the case, the extraction of value from data of these 
companies can be considered unjust.   
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Our examination of the justice of these concrete internet 
platforms must be understood as a “proof of concept” of the 
approach, but could not provide definitive results. There are 
elements in support of the idea that YouTube and Facebook at 
the moment do not deliver equal protection to the freedom of 
speech of their users, but it could be objected that these 
platforms are not dominant enough, or that they provide 
sufficient guarantees of impartial treatment to their users. We 
have also mentioned allegations that Google Search violates the 
“internet Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle” but, due to the 
opacity of Google Search ranking criteria, it is hard if not 
impossible to obtain conclusive evidence60. Finally, we cannot 
determine if the Difference Principle is violated until we achieve a 
more solid understanding of the expectations of the least 
advantaged groups under alternative arrangements of digital 
rights and alternative forms which the data economy could take. 
At least three direct policy implications follow from this analysis: 
1) legal scholars and constitutional judges cannot ignore the 
right to equal protection of freedom of speech expressed 
in the spaces provided by dominant internet platforms; 
2) more transparency is needed to assess whether dominant 
internet platforms violate Rawlsian Principles of Justice. 
Or in other words, justice provides an argument against 
opacity; 
  
60 Due to this opacity, the Directorate-General for Competition of the EU has 
recently opened a 10M Euros tender for expertise to help evaluating 
“processes and methods determining the display and positioning of generic 
search results”  and “paid search results (such as online search advertising)”. 
See European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, “Framework 
Contract for Services Number — Comp/2017/012,” February 2016, 16, 
https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=27863.  See 
also Hirst, “Wanted.”  
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3) governments and societies ought to promote initiatives to 
rethink and revolutionize the way the data economy 
operates.  
 
Only then we will be able to determine whether the distribution 
of income and wealth engendered by existing dominant platforms 
is just or unjust.  
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